Equality &amp; Non-discrimination between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights: Challenges and Perspectives in the Religious Discourse by C. Nardocci
 186 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 3 del 2019 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
Costanza Nardocci 
(Post-Doc Research Fellow in Constitutional Law, Department of Italian and 
Supranational Public Law, University of Milan) 
 
 
Equality & Non-discrimination between the European Court of Justice 
and the European Court of Human Rights. 
Challenges and Perspectives in the Religious Discourse 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Whereas gender, race and ethnicity have been placed at the 
very center of the rediscovery of European anti-discrimination law in the 
last decades, religion seems to stand in the backyard of European Agenda. 
Despite the increasing relevance of religion in the societal and public 
debate, Europe seems to barely consider religion in legislation and 
jurisprudence. No surprise therefore if the European Court of Justice 
delivered no case before 2017 and only two cases in 2017, the European 
Court of Human Rights rarely found violations of Article 9 ECHR 
compared to other conventional rights violations and both Courts have 
scarcely devoted the deserved attention to the discriminatory implications 
of the scrutinized cases. Moving ahead and beyond the legal background 
and given the cross-borders resonance of issues pertaining to human rights, 
the paper discusses and compares the European Union Court of Justice and 
the European Court of Human Rights approaches towards discrimination 
claims on religious ground, by highlighting weaknesses and challenges 
faced by the principle of equality and non-discrimination on account of 
religious belief at the European level. The parallel and combined 
investigation will thus offer an insight into the unsolved questions behind 
the understanding and the legal awareness towards religious 
discrimination.  
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1 - Preliminary Remarks 
 
Whereas gender, race and ethnicity have been placed at the very center of the 
rediscovery of European anti-discrimination law in the last decades, 
religion seems to stand in the backyard of European Agenda. 
Despite the increasing relevance of religion in the societal and public 
debate, Europe seems to barely consider religion in legislation and 
jurisprudence.  
No surprise therefore if the European Court of Justice delivered no 
case before 2017 and only two cases in 2017, the European Court of Human 
Rights rarely found violations of Article 9 ECHR compared to other 
conventional rights violations and both Courts have scarcely devoted the 
deserved attention to the discriminatory implications of the scrutinized 
cases. 
Be it for its contentious linkage with the concepts of “choice and 
immutability”541, efforts to tackle discriminations on religious belief have 
not yet invested all areas of EU anti-discrimination law, whose preference 
has been progressively devoted to other factors, even by leaving religion 
aside from the material scope of the Race Directive 43/2000/CE. The 
Employment Equality Directive, in fact, only prohibits discriminations on 
religious grounds in the fields of employment and occupation, vocational 
training, membership of employer and employee organizations, though 
refraining from following the Race Directive approach as to the width of 
protection. 
Freedom of religion within the EU is then enshrined under Article 
10, Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights together with the general guarantee of non-
discrimination (Article 21) and that of cultural religious and linguistic 
diversity (Article 22). 
On the Council of Europe side, the European Convention - through 
Article 9, 14 and, to some extent, 1, Protocol no. 12 - and the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) have instead played a prominent role in 
addressing issues pertaining to freedom of religion, though generally 
disregarding the discriminatory implications of the scrutinized cases and 
giving precedence to the safeguard of States’ demand of neutrality in the 
public sphere542.  
                                                          
541 On this, arguably, ECJ, Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, AG KOKOTT, § 45 and § 
116. 
542 On this, see J. RINGELHEIM, Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: the European Court 
of Human Rights in Search of a Theory?, in C. Ungureanu, L. Zucca (editors), Law, State and 
Religion in the New Europe. Debates and Dilemma, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 283 
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Moving ahead and beyond the legal background and given the cross-
borders resonance of issues pertaining to human rights, the paper intends 
to discuss and compare the European Union Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) approaches towards 
discrimination claims on religious ground, by highlighting weaknesses and 
challenges faced by the principle of equality and non-discrimination on 
account of religious belief at the European level.  
The parallel and combined investigation will thus offer an insight 
into the unsolved questions behind the understanding and the legal 
awareness towards religious discrimination.  
In following this path, a specific focus will be devoted to the 
adequacy of approaching anti-discrimination claims by interlacing religion 
and ethnicity, as to avoid an unequal or “levelling down” treatment among 
grounds of discrimination, as well as to the challenges surrounding 
supranational Courts’ dependence on the comparator methodology. 
As to its structure, part one presents a theoretical analysis of the 
existing safeguards towards discrimination on religious ground whereas 
part two investigates the ECtHR’s and the ECJ’s approaches in examining 
religious claims by focusing on the comparable and diverse system and 
mechanisms of anti-discrimination protection. 
Ultimately, the paper will pave the way to the ECtHR and ECJ 
responses to the unavoidable question of “how much difference and 
diversity an open and pluralistic European society must tolerate within its 
borders and, conversely, [of] how much assimilation it is permitted to 
require from certain minorities”543 through the lens of the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination. 
 
 
Part One  
Setting the Stage: Theory and Rationale 
 
 
2 - The Notion of Religion: Where to Situate Manifestations of Religious 
Beliefs 
 
Reluctance from defining religion continues to play a role in the case-law of 
the ECtHR and the ECJ.  
                                                          
ss.  
543 Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, AG KOKOTT, § 3. 
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Not only do Courts refrain from clarifying the notion of religion, but, 
even before its increasing impact in shaping societies and individuals’ ways 
of life, the consistent case-law is likely to choose not to interfere with States’ 
preferences as to the relationship between religious faith and national 
order. 
Since EU law reflects the ECtHR’s developments in the interpretation 
of the guarantees set forth under Article 9 of the ECHR544, it is worth 
framing the analysis within the fences of the Conventional system. 
Even in the absence of a stark definition and partly because of that, 
the ECtHR embraces a broad definition of religious belief.  
The ECtHR has in fact progressively recognized an open-ended list 
of religious beliefs and convictions protected under Article 9545, following 
the “loose and ill-defined”546 criteria suggested in Campbell and Cosans v. 
United Kingdom, where it spoke of “views that attain a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance”547. 
                                                          
544 See ECJ, Asma Bougnaoui, Association de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v. 
Micropole SA, “[i]n accordance with that provision, that right includes freedom to change 
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. As 
is apparent from the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 
C 303, p. 17), the right guaranteed in Article 10(1) of the Charter corresponds to the right 
guaranteed in Article 9 of the ECHR and, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, 
has the same meaning and scope. In so far as the ECHR and, subsequently, the Charter use 
the term ‘religion’ in a broad sense, in that they include in it the freedom of persons to 
manifest their religion, the EU legislature must be considered to have intended to take the 
same approach when adopting Directive 2000/78, and therefore the concept of ‘religion’ 
in Article 1 of that directive should be interpreted as covering both the forum internum, 
that is the fact of having a belief, and the forum externum, that is the manifestation of 
religious faith in public”, §§ 29, 30. 
545 See, § 36. On this, see F.J. JACOBS, R. WHITE, C. OVEY, The European Convention on 
Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 2012. Among others, see ECtHR, Jakobsky v. Poland 
(Buddhism); Genov v. Bulgaria (Hinduism); W. v. United Kingdom (veganism); Jehovah’s 
Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia (The Jehovah’s Witnesses); Izzetin Dogan v. Turkey 
(Alevism); Francesco Sessa v. Italy (Judaism); Leyla Sahin v. Turkey (Islam); 
546 F.J. JACOBS, R. WHITE, C. OVEY, The European Convention on Human Rights, cit., p. 
403. 
547 A more elaborated reflection of what constitutes a religious belief can be found in 
Eweida and Others v. UK, where the ECtHR argued that “[e]ven where the belief in question 
attains the required level of cogency and importance, it cannot be said that every act which 
is in some way inspired, motivated or influenced by it constitutes a ‘manifestation’ of the 
belief. Thus, for example, acts or omissions which do not directly express the belief 
concerned or which are only remotely connected to a precept of faith fall outside the 
protection of Article 9 § 1[…]. In order to count as a ‘manifestation’ within the meaning of 
Article 9, the act in question must be intimately linked to the religion or belief”, § 82. By 
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Since the Kokkinakis v. Greece case and in the light of § 2, the ECtHR 
has also expanded Article 9’s protection to the so-called forum externun 
admitting that, alongside “matter[s] of individual conscience”548 dealing 
with the forum internun aspect, religious freedom “implies […] freedom to 
‘manifest [one’s] religion”, meaning “freedom to hold or not to hold 
religious beliefs and to practice or not to practice a religion”549 in fields such 
as employment or education. 
The dual dimension of the protection - in terms of its private and 
public aspect together with its individual and collective resonance550 - 
echoes the prominent place of Article 9 within the Convention system as it 
represents, as the Court suggested, “one of the most vital elements that go 
to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life […], a 
precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned”551 as 
well as one of the foundations of a democratic society due to its linkage with 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness552. 
Whereas freedom of religion (forum internum) is an absolute right 
with no restrictions, freedom to manifest religious beliefs clearly illustrates 
the challenges faced by multiethnic and multi-religious societies in 
accommodating religious diversity within national borders or, conversely, 
in preserving a policy of State neutrality.  
                                                          
contrast, a detailed indication of cases where the ECtHR refused to apply Article 9, § 1, can 
be found in Guide on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2018, p. 13 ss. 
548 ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, § 31. 
549 ECtHR, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, § 104. 
550 In Article 9’s perspective, the community element “goes beyond the mere coming 
together of individuals in the collective enjoyment of their individual freedom and extends 
to the recognition of an associative life which is to be protected as a necessary expression 
of that freedom. Within that religious associative life, individuals will be bound by its rules 
and the primary protection for their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
lies in their being able to leave and disassociate themselves from the community. The state 
is to avoid entering into religious or doctrinal questions within that associative life, other 
than to test them for compatibility with the foundational convention values of democratic 
governance, pluralism and tolerance. It is not for the Court to comment on the practices of 
the religious community, although they may of course be limited in accordance with 
Article 9(2)”, M.D. EVANS, Manual on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas, 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2009, p. 34. In the case-law, see ECtHR, Metropolitan Church 
of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, § 118; Izzetin Dogan and others v. Turkey; Moscow Branch 
of the Salvation Army v. Russia. 
551 ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, § 31. 
552 For an in-depth investigation, see J. RINGELHEIM, Diversité culturelle et droits de 
l’homme. La protection des minorités par la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 
Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2006. 
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It is therefore subjected to the limitations set forth under Article 9, § 
2, keeping in mind the principles outlined in the ECtHR’s case law: the 
preservation of a sentiment of “mutual tolerance between opposing 
groups”553; the safeguard of pluralism554; the necessity to strike a balance 
among opposite interests acknowledging the individual and collective 
dimension of the claims in a non-majoritarian perspective. 
Irrespectively on the model of society adopted by the Contracting 
States, the ECtHR has thus provided some, although poor, guidance to the 
question of what constitutes manifestation of religion or belief.  
Moving beyond the adamant dichotomy between conducts that are 
“motivated or influenced by a religion or belief”555 and the relevant conduct 
required by Article 9 § 1 as being a manifestation of the belief in 
“practice”556, in Jakòbski v. Poland the Court began to suggest a softer 
approach qualifying, in that case, as a religious practice a meat-free dietary 
request. Without so much delving into its qualification as an act motivated 
by religion or as a pure manifestation of religion, the Court simply argued 
that  
“without deciding whether such decisions are taken in every case to 
fulfil(sic) a religious duty […] the Court considers that the applicant’s 
decision to adhere to a vegetarian diet can be regarded as motivated or 
inspired by a religion and was not unreasonable”557. 
 
Similarly, overturning Dahlab v. Switzerland where it was described 
as a “powerful external symbol” not protected under Article 9, the 
consistent ECtHR’s case-law now plainly qualifies the Islamic headscarf as 
a religious protected under Article 9 of the European Convention558. 
Notwithstanding the wider approach reached by the more recent 
case-law as to enlargement of the notion of religious manifestations, the 
ECtHR has though not yet provided sufficient guidance as to the definition 
of religion within the meaning of Article 9 and, mostly, with respect to the 
admitted restrictions, especially when minorities are concerned. 
Despite lack of clarity in defining grounds of discrimination recurs 
in almost any branch of anti-discrimination law, the presumed non inherent 
nature of religion, as a chosen rather than intrinsic human trait such as 
                                                          
553 Inter alia, ECtHR, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldovia, § 123. 
554 ECtHR, Serif v. Greece, § 53. 
555 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom, § 123. 
556 See on this the strict approach endorsed by the Commission in Arrowsmith v. United 
Kingdom. 
557 ECtHR, Jakòbski v. Poland, § 45. 
558 The reference here is specifically to S.a.s. v. France. 
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gender, sex or race - so greatly emphasized in the AG opinions in Achbita 
and Bouagnoui as it will be further discussed -, seems to trigger the risk of 
hierarchical approaches to religion-based discrimination claims559.  
As to the status of religion confronted with other grounds of 
discrimination, at least in one case the ECtHR has pooled religion with 
ethnicity. 
From this angle, a point worth mentioning revolves around the 
relationship between religion and ethnicity due to the relationship 
entertained by the latter with the notion of race.  
Do ethnicity and religion complement each other or do they always 
consist in two separate grounds of discrimination, entailing separate 
reviews? 
Neither the Strasbourg Court or EU law offer responses, but a 
suggestion in the direction of a joint consideration of ethnicity and religion 
was prompted by the ECtHR in Timishev v. Russia. 
In the attempt to make a distinction between race and ethnicity, the 
Court held that  
 
“[e]thnicity and race are related and overlapping concepts. Whereas 
the notion of race is rooted in the idea of biological classification of 
human beings into subspecies according to morphological features 
such as skin color or facial characteristics, ethnicity has its origin in the 
idea of societal groups marked by common nationality, tribal affiliation, 
religious faith, shared language, or cultural and traditional origins and 
backgrounds”.  
 
However, the established connection between religion and ethnicity, 
as intertwined factors560, leaves the door open to the treatment reserved to 
the latter in the ECtHR case-law.  
Whilst discriminations based on ethnicity require very weighty or 
compelling reasons to be justified under the Convention561, in that echoing 
the safeguard afforded to race, even after Vojnity v. Hungary562 in which for 
                                                          
559 The topic will be further discussed under Part Two. 
560 See, ECtHR, Milanovic v. Serbia (no. 7) § 97.  
561 For an analysis of the ECtHR’s case-law on racial and ethnic discrimination, see C. 
NARDOCCI, Razza e etnia. La discriminazione tra individuo e gruppo nella dimensione 
costituzionale e sovranazionale, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2016. 
562 ECtHR, Vojnity v. Hungary, where the Court argued, for the very first time, that “in 
the light of the importance of the rights enshrined in Article 9 of the Convention in 
guaranteeing the individual’s self-fulfilment, such a treatment will only be compatible with 
the Convention if very weighty reasons exist”, § 36. For a more detailed analysis of the 
rationale upheld in the case, see J. GERARDS, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, the Very 
Weighty Reasons Test and Grounds of Discrimination, in M. Balboni (ed), The principle of 
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the very first time the ECtHR spoke of religion as a suspected ground, 
scrutiny on religion-based discriminations continues to rest on the wide 
margin of appreciation afforded to the Contracting States and on a slightly 
lenient review563.  
 
 
3 - Direct & Indirect Discrimination under the EU and the ECHR system 
 
Another facet warrant a preliminary reflection deals with the direct and 
indirect forms of discrimination from their theorization to their concrete 
application. 
The European Convention and EU law recognize the 
multidimensional nature of discrimination, sanctioning conducts that 
imply differences in treatment based on suspected grounds and practices 
that, although coached in neutral terms, cause disadvantages on a group. 
How these notions of discrimination have been interpreted and 
applied in the case-law on religious freedom will be further analyzed.  
The purpose here is to briefly highlight the ongoing challenges 
encountered by Courts in verifying the recurrence of either a direct or 
indirect forms of discrimination in order to better investigate the case-law 
analysis proposed in Part Two. 
To begin with, the first one concerns the identification of the tertium 
comparationis, be it the individual or the group, and its nature, be it concrete 
or hypothetical. 
In the former, dependent on the individual or group based approach 
is the interpretation of the act at issue as direct or indirect discrimination, 
which might be contested over trials due to the absolute prohibition of 
direct discriminations versus the possible reasonable and objective 
justification underneath a disparate impact or a particular disadvantage 
suffered by the group.  
                                                          
discrimination and the European Convention of Human Rights, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli; L. 
PERONI, “Very Weighty Reasons” for Religion: Vojnity v. Hungary, in StrasbourgObserver.com; 
K. HENRARD, Duties of Reasonable Accommodation. In Relation to Religion and The European 
Court of Human Rights: a Closer Look At The Prohibition of Discrimination, the Freedom of 
Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality, in Erasmus Law Review, 2012, p. 59. 
563 On this, see S. FREDMAN, Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality and Article 
14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in Human Rights Law Review, in Human Rights 
Law Review, 2016, p. 273 ss.; O. ARNARDOTTIR, Vulnerability under Article 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Innovation or Business as Usual?, in Oslo Law Review, 
p. 150 ss. In the ECtHR case-law, see Lautsi and Others v. Italy, and S.A.S. v. France. 
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In the latter, the path from the traditional antidiscrimination model 
centered on a merely comparative approach to the so-called substantive 
rights model, endorsed by EU law, has brought about an extension of the 
antidiscrimination principle in terms of its capability to intercept 
discriminatory behaviors even when a concrete comparator is lacking. 
This is especially true for EU law and for the suggested definition of 
direct and indirect discrimination that came with the Race Directive 
2000/43 and the Framework Directive 2000/78. 
As to indirect discrimination, EU law does not require anymore the 
proof of a disparate impact supported by a comparative analysis, but 
merely the hypothetical feasibility of a particular disadvantage that might 
occur on a disadvantaged social group564.  
With respect to direct discrimination, following the Feryn case565, on 
the interpretation of certain provisions of the Race Directive, the ECJ has 
paved the way to a new approach to direct discrimination, unleashing the 
causal link between the conduct and the quest for a concrete detrimental 
effect: in other words “the comparator need not ‘exist’; establishment of the 
probability of ‘his’ or ‘her’ better treatment will be enough”566. 
Before the ECtHR however contours appear blurred.  
Article 14’s weakness has largely impacted on the scarce 
implementation of antidiscrimination cases together with the habit of the 
ECtHR to neglect investigation over alleged violations of Article 14. This 
results in few violations of Article 14 and in a less detailed theoretical 
approach as to the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination - 
the former is never explicitly mentioned in the case-law as such - and to the 
role of the comparator methodology.  
                                                          
564 On this, EU law shows to follow the ECJ’s approach explained in the O’Flyn case 
where the ECJ stated that: “unless objectively justified and proportionate to its aim, a 
provision of national law must be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it is intrinsically 
able to affect migrant workers more than national workers and if there is a consequent risk 
that it will place the former at a particular disadvantage. It is not necessary in this respect 
to find that the provision in question does in practice affect a substantially higher 
proportion of migrant workers. It is sufficient that it is liable to have such an effect. Further, 
the reasons why a migrant worker chooses to make use of his freedom of movement within 
the Community are not to be taken into account in assessing whether a national provision 
is discriminatory. The possibility of exercising so fundamental a freedom as the freedom 
of movement of persons cannot be limited by such considerations, which are purely 
subjective”, § 20. 
565 ECJ, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding contro Firma Feryn 
NV. 
566 E. HOLZLEITHNER, Mainstreaming Equality: Dis/Entangling Grounds of 
Discrimination, in Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs., 2005, p. 934. 
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Whereas the consistent interpretation of Article 14 has been 
developed since the well-known Belgian Linguistic case on the criteria 
revealing discrimination on suspected grounds, the very first case the 
ECtHR found the recurrence of an indirect discrimination is fairly recent 
and dates back in 2007 with the D.H. & Others case, where the Strasbourg 
Court held that “a difference in treatment may take the form of 
disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, 
though couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a group”567. 
Secondly, another difficulty might arise in the identification of the 
“correct” or “true” comparator. As it will be further discussed, a wrongful 
comparison might be sometimes used by Courts in the attempt to dismiss 
cases or merely to deny the recurrence of a directly discriminatory 
behavior568. 
A third argument that can possibly affect the choice of the 
comparator regards the establishment of the individual’s membership or 
affiliation to the targeted group.  
To this regard, both systems openly recognize the possibility to 
sanction discriminatory conducts even without a deep rooted investigation 
on the victim’s affiliation and merely looking at his or hers presumed or 
perceived characteristics (the so-called discrimination by association). This 
is of crucial importance for a claim to be successful in cases covering 
inherent individual traits such as gender, race, ethnicity and religion as 
well569, where the lack of definitions and of universally accepted criteria 
establishing membership may impede Courts’ finding of alleged violations. 
Beyond the implications surrounding the identification of the tertium 
comparationis, stands the role of Courts in rooting out discriminatory 
conducts. The extent to which Courts afford discretion in ascertaining who 
is the comparator - the individual or the group - and from which perspective 
- the concrete or the hypothetical one - may in fact very much affect the 
qualification of a behavior as directly or indirectly discriminatory, the 
subsequent severity of the scrutiny and eventually the outcome of the case. 
Moving on from this line of reasoning, the group concept featuring 
indirect discriminations impacts on a fourth challenge that involves 
procedural issues in anti-discrimination law and, more specifically, the 
gathering evidence process.  
                                                          
567 See, also, ECtHR, Biao v. Denmark, § 107. 
568 See, S. HAVERKORT, p. 208, and Part Two. 
569 See, ECJ, S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve Law; ECtHR, Škorjanec v. Croatia. 
 196 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 3 del 2019 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
As to the evidence, since D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, the ECtHR 
has firmly established statistics as admitted evidence of indirect 
discrimination and same is for the ECJ. 
Difficulties for both forms of discrimination might though remain in 
cases of conducts lacking data or whose not reliance on a normative legal 
basis makes it complex to verify their concrete, and likely discriminatory, 
realization.  
Alongside statistics, another challenge has to do with the rules on the 
burden of proof that might be sometimes shared between the complainant 
and the respondent, meaning shifted from the former to the latter, as it has 
been admittedly held by the ECtHR in hate-crime cases570.  
To sum up, the unbinding interlace between substantial and 
procedural aspects encompasses both systems of anti-discrimination 
strategy. What may make the difference is the supranational Courts’ 
tendency to avoid or, conversely, tackle discriminatory behaviors as the 
jurisprudence on religious discrimination will reveal. 
 
 
4 - Balancing Freedom of Religion: the Proportionality Test in the Light 
of States’ Margin of Appreciation 
 
How Courts verify the recurrence of a violation of the principle of equality 
and non-discrimination and the weight attached to the so-called 
proportionality test also warrants reflection. 
Both the ECJ and the ECtHR require that a fair balance among 
competing interests, that of the individual and that of the community, needs 
to be struck in order to reject a presumption of discrimination.  
A three step analysis where appropriateness, necessity and the so-
called “proportionality strictu sensu” - in that it has to be established a 
proportionality between “the aim(s) of the measure and the interest(s) 
harmed” - or, in the case of the ECtHR, a more loose and sometimes lenient 
scrutiny of reasonableness, need to be judicially ascertained.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully examine the ways in 
which the ECJ and the ECtHR undertake this test571. These mechanisms 
nevertheless call into question Courts’ assessment of proportionality, 
meaning the intensity of the review and the elements that come into play. 
                                                          
570 See ECtHR, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria. 
571 Inter alia, S. VAN DROOGHENBROECK, La proportionnalité dans le droit de la 
Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme. Prendre l’idée simple au sérieux, Bruylant, 
Bruxelles, 2001. 
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Firstly, the intensity of the proportionality test varies and performs 
differently on account of the wide or viceversa narrow margin of 
appreciation afforded to national States572. This means that the strictness of 
the review largely depends on the width of control Courts accept to exercise 
towards national States.  
As it will be outlined below, in religion-based discriminatory claims, 
the ECJ’s and the ECtHR’s stance appears that of softening the 
proportionality test by giving precedence to States’ margin of discretion, 
therefore avoiding a thoroughly investigation on the invoked violation of 
the non-discrimination principle. Be it for the assumed better placed 
position enjoyed by national States, where ethics and moral have a say, or 
for the lacking political representation affecting both Courts, when religious 
discrimination enters the scene hardly Courts end up with the finding of 
violations. 
Secondly, though there is no explicit hierarchy among factors of 
discrimination573, the case-law on religion-based discrimination claims 
reveals, in the writer’s perspective, a marked tendency in making use of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine in cases involving religious freedom 
through references to the lacking consensus among the member States.  
Thirdly, the increasing “popularity” of secularism in deciding claims 
- especially when conceived as implying the neutrality of public spaces - has 
greatly affected the reasoning underling the proportionality test574. The 
Strasbourg Court, in particular, has shown a preference to surrender 
proportionality to secularism by interpreting it as an objective justification 
of interferences with religious manifestations.  
All these three aspects will be jointly considered in the light of the 
selected case-law in Part two of the paper. 
 
 
 
                                                          
572 See, for an insight into the implication surrounding the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, G. LETSAS, A theory of interpretation of the European Convention of Human rights, 
Oxford University Press, 2007; E. BENVENISTI, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and 
Universal Standards, in International Law and Politics, p. 843 ss.; E. BREMS, The Margin of 
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reference to the partially concurring opinion of Judge O’LEARY and to the dissenting 
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